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ABSTRACT
For benefit corporations to persuade their various audiences that they
are as beneficial for society as they claim, they need reliable assessments
of their social performance. Even if assessments were not required by most
states’ benefit corporation statutes, it is difficult to imagine the benefit
corporation form could gain credibility without them. Creating
measurement tools for these assessments poses the twin challenges of
balancing simplicity against validity and weighing vision against
inclusiveness. This article examines how B Lab’s popular assessment tool
engages these challenges.
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INTRODUCTION
Benefit corporations advertise themselves as different from ordinary,
for-profit companies. They are better, more responsible, and kinder, and
should therefore be treated differently. Employees should be willing to
work for them for less money and remain for longer periods because they
treat their employees well and because working for them means trying to
make the world a better place. Customers should seek out their products
and services, even at a premium price, because customers should want to
support the companies’ efforts to improve society. Investors should
finance them even if the expected financial returns are lower because the
social returns more than make up the difference. Communities should
welcome and support them because they will prove to be loyal and
dependable local citizens.
To achieve all these benefits, though, these various audiences must
buy the pitch; they must believe that benefit corporations will truly deliver
their promises. Credibility is therefore the key challenge benefit
corporations face.
The Benefit Corporation Model Legislation (the Model Act) includes
a few mechanisms to help boost the credibility of the entity’s social value.1
Publicly traded corporations must have—and other corporations may
have—a member of the board of directors designated as the “benefit
director,” who must report annually on the company’s success in pursuing
its social purpose.2 Benefit corporations may also appoint a “benefit
officer” to fulfill whatever duties the company’s bylaws provide, including
preparing the company’s benefit report.3 Shareholders who own at least
2% of a class of the company’s outstanding shares have the power to bring
a “benefit enforcement proceeding” against the corporation or its officers
or directors for failing to provide a public benefit.4 Benefit corporations
1. Most states that have passed legislation to enable benefit corporations have used some version
of the Model Act, with Delaware and Washington being notable exceptions. Unlike the Model Act,
Delaware’s statute does not require benefit corporations to assess their social performance against a
third-party standard.
2. See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. §302 (2016).
3. Id. §§ 304, 401.
4. Id. § 305(c)(2)(i).
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must also release an annual report analyzing their social performance and
make this report available on the company’s website.5 The heart of this
report is an “assessment of the overall social and environmental
performance of the benefit corporation against a third-party standard.”6
These safeguards are, for the most part, toothless. Nothing assures
that the benefit director or officer has either the inclination or the power to
monitor the company, and neither position is mandated in closely held
corporations. The benefit enforcement proceeding can produce at most
injunctive relief, because the Model Act bars financial liability.7 Plus, only
the company itself, the directors, and certain large shareholders have
standing to bring benefit enforcement proceedings.8 In closely held
companies, none of these participants are likely to have an incentive to
enforce the company’s social mission with a lawsuit, barring unusual
circumstances.9
The benefit report is therefore the only statutory measure likely to
have a real impact on a benefit corporation’s credibility, and the utility of
the report hinges on the quality of the third-party standard by which the
company’s social performance is measured. It also depends on the
credibility of the information the companies provide.
The success of the benefit corporation experiment, then, rests on the
ability of private entities to develop good standards to monitor companies’
disclosure statements for accuracy.
The experiment must also avoid the pitfalls that have tripped up other
third-party disclosure providers, such as credit ratings agencies.10
Although the accuracy of these agencies’ ratings is theoretically assured
by the agencies’ desire to preserve their valuable reputations (under
“reputational capital theory”),11 the legal requirements to obtain ratings
5. Id. §§ 401–402.
6. Id. § 401(a)(2).
7. Id. § 301(c) (directors are not personally liable for monetary damages for the company’s
failure to create a public benefit); Id. § 303(c) (officers are not personally liable for monetary damages
for the company’s failure to provide a public benefit); Id. § 305(b) (benefit corporations are not liable
for monetary damages for failing to create a public benefit).
8. Id. § 305(c).
9. As of this writing, no publicly traded benefit corporations exist. Laureate Education, Inc., a
benefit corporation, has announced its intention to complete a public offering, but has not yet done so.
See Carrie Wells, Laureate Education Files for IPO, BALT. SUN (Oct. 2, 2015),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/business/bs-bz-laureate-ipo-20151002-story.html
[https://perma.cc/
B26F-AMW8]. Etsy Inc. is a public company and a certified B Corp, but is not (at least not yet) a
benefit corporation. See Jena McGregor, What Etsy, Patagonia, and Warby Parker Have in Common,
WASH. POST (Apr. 20, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/on-leadership/wp/2015/
04/20/what-etsy-patagonia-and-warby-parker-have-in-common/ [https://perma.cc/Z9MF-MERN].
10. I am indebted to Frank Partnoy for this point.
11. See, e.g., Nan S. Ellis et al., Is Imposing Liability on Credit Rating Agencies A Good Idea?:
Credit Rating Agency Reform in the Aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, 17 STAN. J.L. BUS. &
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from the agencies for various purposes have added a value to the ratings
aside from their accuracy. The market’s disciplining impact on inaccurate
ratings has been diluted by this alternative value source, reducing the
agencies’ incentive to invest in accuracy (“regulatory license theory”).12
The legal requirement for a third-party standard under the Model Act could
suffer from similar weaknesses.
B Lab, the pioneering nonprofit that invented benefit corporations
and drafted the Model Act, offers a comprehensive third-party standard.
In addition, B Lab offers companies the ability to earn certification as a
“B Corp” by scoring sufficiently high on its assessment and paying an
annual fee.13 Certified companies are potentially subject to periodic audits
to ensure the information provided in the assessment is accurate.14 As of
this writing, B Lab has certified more than 1,700 companies as B Corps,15
while there are approximately 3,000 benefit corporations in the country.16
In addition, B Lab says that more than 30,000 companies have registered
to take its assessment.17 While not all certified companies are benefit
corporations, these numbers indicate that B Lab’s assessment tool is
incredibly important and influential in the benefit corporation community.
This Article will therefore examine B Lab’s assessment tool. First, in
Part I, I will discuss what an ideal assessment tool would look like; that is,
FIN. 175, 180 (2012); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency,
70 VA. L. REV. 549, 604–05 (1984); Jonathan R. Macey, Wall Street Versus Main Street: How
Ignorance, Hyperbole, and Fear Lead to Regulation, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1487, 1502–05 (1998).
12. See, e.g., Frank Partnoy, How and Why Credit Ratings Agencies Are Not Like Other
Gatekeepers, in YASUYUKI FUCHITA & ROBERT E. LITAN, FINANCIAL GATEKEEPERS: CAN THEY
PROTECT INVESTORS? (2006); Frank Partnoy, Overdependence on Credit Ratings Was a Primary
Cause of the Crisis, in LAWRENCE MITCHELL & ARTHUR WILMARTH, THE PANIC OF 2008: CAUSES,
CONSEQUENCES, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR REFORM (2010); Frank Partnoy, The Paradox of Credit
Ratings, in RICHARD M. LEVITCH, ET AL., THE ROLE OF CREDIT REPORTING SYSTEMS IN THE
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY (2002); Frank Partnoy, Barbarians at the Gatekeepers?: A Proposal for a
Modified Strict Liability Regime, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 491 (2001); Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert
of Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs Down for the Credit Ratings Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619
(1999).
13. See How to Become a B Corp., B LAB, https://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-b-corp/howto-become-a-b-corp [https://perma.cc/CK3J-T6J7]; Performance Requirements, B LAB,
https://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-b-corp/how-to-become-a-b-corp/performance-requirements
[https://perma.cc/FZ7Z-A98D] [hereinafter Performance Requirements]; Pricing, B LAB,
https://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-b-corp/how-to-become-a-b-corp/make-it-official
[https://perma.cc/RT23-78Q9].
14. See Performance Requirements, supra note 13.
15. See B LAB, https://www.bcorporation.net/ [https://perma.cc/7JFV-67NT] (1,895 B Corps as
of October 6, 2016).
16. See Nicole Fallon Taylor, Becoming a Benefit Corporation: Is it Right for Your Business?,
BUS. NEWS DAILY (Jan. 22, 2016), http://www.businessnewsdaily.com/8734-benefit-corporation.html
[https://perma.cc/GX7F-CCDP].
17. See B Impact Assessment Overview, B LAB (on file with the author) [hereinafter Assessment
Overview].
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I will provide an assessment tool for assessment tools. Then, in Part II, I
will briefly describe B Lab’s assessment process before analyzing how
well it achieves the goals of an ideal assessment in Part III and then
summing up in the conclusion.
I. THE IDEAL ASSESSMENT TOOL
Designing the ideal assessment tool requires some thinking about the
needs of the different groups that will use it.18 For some users, the purpose
of the assessment tool is to provide “targeted transparency.”19 These users
want disclosure of enough information to enable them to make educated
choices, but not so much that they must choose between investing
significant resources to digest the data and ignoring the data altogether.
Consumers, for example, may be interested in purchasing products or
services made by companies that mirror their social values. Such socially
minded consumers need a quick and easy method of distinguishing
pro-social companies from the purely profit focused. They will not invest
the time needed to parse through a prolix securities-style disclosure
statement.
For these users, the information provided must be easily and quickly
digestible or it is useless, because the decisions at stake are insufficiently
valuable to warrant bearing significant information costs. Users in this
category likely include not only consumers but also employees and some
communities: market participants who would like to encourage pro-social
corporate behavior but only if the cost of doing so is fairly minimal.
Users with more at stake may want disclosures that are significantly
more voluminous, or “robust transparency.” Lenders, investors, and some
communities may need more than a superficial sense that a company seeks
something beyond profits. Because these groups’ investments can be
substantial, they are likely to require much more detailed information
about the extent to which a company is aiding society in its operations.
With so much more at stake, they also have the required incentive to invest
the time and expertise to digest a more extensive disclosure device.
Perhaps the most critical members of the audience for an assessment
tool are the pro-social companies themselves. The assessment methods for
benefit corporations are by statute selected by the company being
assessed.20 In order to appeal to this group, an assessment tool must be
cheap and easy to use. Few benefit corporations are likely to choose a tool

18. I am indebted to Anne Tucker for pointing this out.
19. See Daniel E. Ho, Fudging the Nudge: Information Disclosure and Restaurant Grading, 122
YALE L.J. 574, 578 (2012) (describing targeted transparency).
20. See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 401 (2016).

520

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 40:515

that demands too much in terms of executive attention or financial
resources, at least if less burdensome alternatives are available.
At the same time, an assessment tool that lacks credibility will
provide little benefit. In order to obtain the tangible benefits that may be
associated with benefit corporation status—such as inducing employees to
work harder and consumers to pay more—a business must find a means of
communicating a credible message of its pro-social nature. The
assessment tool is instrumental in these efforts, since it purportedly
measures the company’s social virtue. If consumers, employees, or other
target audiences disbelieve the measure, it will do the company little good.
For benefit corporations, then, the assessment tool must be both cheap and
credible; they desire both “credible transparency” and “efficient
transparency.”
The three major audiences for assessments tools have sometimes
overlapping, sometimes conflicting goals. These can be usefully broken
down into four categories: simplicity, validity, vision, and inclusiveness.21
The tool should be simple both to use and to understand, consistent
with the goals of targeted and efficient transparency. Companies should
not have to spend a great deal of time or money to apply the tool and obtain
a measurement of their social contributions. They should be able to use
metrics they are already gathering for other purposes to minimize expense.
Consumers of the information—employees, customers, investors,
communities—should be able to understand the results easily without the
sort of detailed, difficult reading involved in parsing a prospectus, for
example. A single letter grade (A through F), descriptor (gold, silver,
bronze), or numeric score would be ideal if it could convey all the
information desired.
The tool should produce valid results. A simple and cheap metric is
useless if it does not measure what it aims to assess. Part of validity is
accuracy; there must be some method of assuring that the results the
company reports are both precise—the company did not err—and
honest—the company did not lie. Both will generally require some
objective, outside confirmation. In other words, the results must be
credibly transparent.
To count as valid, a measure must also comport with the user’s goals.
For example, a chef who wants to ensure a turkey is cooked might measure
the bird’s surface temperature. That would not be a valid measure because
the oven will heat the surface of the turkey before the interior, so the
21. There is no method of program evaluation that works for all types of programs. Instead, a
program evaluation method must be tailored to the particular context. See Joan MacLeod Heminway,
Desire, Conservatism, Underfunding, Congressional Meddling, and Study Fatigue: Ingredients for
Ongoing Reform at the Securities and Exchange Commission?, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 443, 451–52 (2012).
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surface might be very hot but the interior might still be raw. A valid
measure would take the turkey’s interior temperature because that does
correspond with what the chef wants to know—whether the meat is
cooked. Therefore, measures are not universally valid or invalid in the
sense I am using the terms; a measure’s validity depends on its user’s goal.
The assessment must reflect a coherent vision of how companies
should be helping society. There is no single, correct view of what it means
to be a socially responsible company, but an assessment tool should
represent some particular conception. A measurement tool will
unavoidably reflect some perspective on this question; by giving credit (or
taking credit away) for certain actions or policies, the tool will necessarily
push some vision. So it is critical that the vision be self-consciously
constructed, consistent, and articulated clearly so that both companies and
the consumers of the results know what a good score on the assessment
means. This criterion is related to validity; vision sets the goals, and
validity ensures that what is being measured meets them. Vision is also
part of targeted transparency, because it helps make scores easy to
understand.
Finally, a measurement tool should be inclusive. Even within the
scope of a coherent vision for socially responsible entities, individual
companies will choose to emphasize different aspects of that vision. Some
might focus on environmental responsibility, others on helping the
disadvantaged, and still others on making the workplace flexible and
family-friendly. The measurement tool should be sufficiently flexible to
reward companies for embracing some aspects of the vision, even if they
do not successfully implement them all.
There is a fifth characteristic that is often cited as important for
assessment tools: the independence of the drafting body.22 For example,
the American National Standards Institute’s accreditation rules for
standards creators mandate:
The standards development process shall not be dominated by any
single interest category, individual or organization. Dominance
means a position or exercise of dominant authority, leadership, or
influence by reason of superior leverage, strength, or representation
to the exclusion of fair and equitable consideration of other
viewpoints.23

22. I am grateful to Dan Osusky for raising this point.
23. ANSI Essential Requirements: Due Process Requirements for American National Standards
AM. NAT’L STANDARDS INST., § 1.2 (Jan. 2016), https://share.ansi.org/shared%20
documents/Standards%20Activities/American%20National%20Standards/Procedures,%20Guides,%
20and%20Forms/2016_ANSI_Essential_Requirements.pdf [https://perma.cc/VM4H-S7YV].
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The standards setter’s independence and objectivity are important,
but only indirectly. Ultimately what matters is whether the standards meet
the four substantive goals. Independence tends to boost confidence that the
standards setter will design the standards in good faith, but it is a means to
an end, not the end itself.
B Lab has an incentive to set an easy standard. Companies pay for
certification only if they qualify by earning at least 80 out of 200 possible
points on the B Impact Assessment (BIA).24 The more companies that
qualify, the larger the group of companies that might pay B Lab for
certification.
To avoid this conflict of interest, the BIA is not written by B Lab.
Instead, the Standards Advisory Council (the Council) controls the BIA.25
The Council consists of independent experts and representatives of
different stakeholder groups.26 Bart Houlahan, B Lab’s co-founder, is a
member of the Council’s Developed Markets subgroup.27 There are also
two members of B Lab listed as members of the Health and Safety
Working Group.28 But the vast majority of Council members are
employees of separate and independent organizations.29 Both because the
Council appears to be (mostly) independent of B Lab, and because the
Council’s independence is only indirectly important to the BIA’s
effectiveness, I will not further address this issue in this Article.
There are significant tensions among the four substantive goals of
simplicity, validity, vision, and inclusivity. A simple measure of a
behavior as complex as pro-social economic activity is unlikely to be
valid. Conversely, a measure sufficiently sophisticated to capture that
activity is unlikely to be simple. Similarly, an assessment tool that presents
a strong vision will have difficulty including those who disagree with
aspects of the vision, and an assessment tool that attempts to include
everyone is unlikely to possess a coherent vision. No assessment tool can
achieve perfection across all four goals. Instead, assessment designers
must choose how heavily to weigh each of these values in trading one off
against the others. The next Part will set out the major aspects of B Lab’s
assessment tool, and the following section will explore how well that tool
makes these trade-off decisions.

24. See How to Become a B Corp., supra note 13.
25. See Frequently Asked Questions, B LAB, http://bimpactassessment.net/how-it-works/
frequently-asked-questions/top-10#who-develops-the-standards [https://perma.cc/4NALUCYK].
26. See Standards Advisory Council, B CORPORATION, https://www.bcorporation.net/what-areb-corps/the-non-profit-behind-b-corps/standards-advisory-council [https://perma.cc/3Y75-NX6L].
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See id. (listing Council members).
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II. B LAB’S ASSESSMENT TOOL
B Lab’s assessment tool, known as the “B Impact Assessment” or
“BIA,” (which recall is written by the Council, not B Lab directly) consists
of an online questionnaire available on its website.30 The assessment is
customized based on the company’s size (six categories), its industry
sector (four categories), and the state of development of its geographic
market (three categories).31 As a result, there are in effect seventy-two
different versions of the BIA.32 Plus, there are addenda for a few industries
whose impact the Council feels the BIA does not adequately measure on
its own. These include micro-finance lenders, investors and investment
advisors, and environmentally friendly building companies.33
Companies answer the questions online and receive an aggregate
score on a 200-point scale.34 Companies that score 80 points or above
qualify for certification, but benefit corporations may use the assessment
to fulfill their requirement of measuring their social performance against
a third-party standard regardless of whether they are seeking certification
status or qualify for certification.35
The BIA asks questions that cover four “impact areas.” These include
governance, workers, community, and the environment.36 Each impact
area (and each indicator within each impact area) is allocated points based
on the Council’s view of the relative importance of that area or indicator
for companies in the relevant category (industry, size, etc.).37
B Lab says that the BIA’s governance questions measure, “[t]he
extent to which social and environmental considerations are engrained into
the business, financial responsibility and oversight, transparency, and the
prevention of negative outcomes.”38 Governance is important to a
company’s pro-social orientation, according to B Lab, because it
demonstrates a company’s ability and inclination to act benevolently.39
Questions the BIA asks under this category include inquiries about the
company’s code of ethics; anti-corruption systems; financial controls;
whistleblower policies; independence, composition, and activity of the
board of directors; policies concerning growth; shareholder engagement;
30. See B LAB, www.bimpactassessment.net [https://perma.cc/9YBD-RL7W].
31. See Assessment Overview, supra note 17.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Interview with Dan Osusky, B Lab Standards Associate (May 23, 2016) (notes on file with
the author) [hereinafter Osusky Interview].
38. See Assessment Overview, supra note 17.
39. Id.
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CEO compensation; employee training and evaluation; feedback from
stakeholders; and other comparable issues.40
The workers category is aimed at discovering the company’s
treatment of its employees along four dimensions: financial, social,
physical, and professional.41 The BIA asks about these categories because
they are directly important, not because they may indirectly lead to
achieving other important values, as was true of the governance questions.
This category includes questions on topics such as: employee ownership;
employee governance rights; employee compensation structure;
percentage of employees who work full-time versus part-time; worker
training programs; internal promotions; benefits provided, such as health
care and retirement; maternity and paternity leave; vacation; severance
benefits; safety standards; wellness programs; worker satisfaction; and
related topics.42
Community questions attempt to discover the company’s impact on
the communities in which it functions. This includes not only the creation
of jobs but also charitable donations and stimulus of other companies in
the region.43 This is also an area where the BIA is attempting to measure
a company’s beneficial impact directly, unlike the governance category.
The community questions inquire as to the company’s charitable
donations; its involvement with the charities to which it donates beyond
the donation itself; the impact of the company’s product or service;
transparency as to the company’s supply chain; the company’s use of
small-scale suppliers; the company’s vigilance as to working conditions at
its suppliers’ facilities; sourcing from under-served supplier groups, such
as those in low-income areas; sourcing from local suppliers; sales to local
consumers; employment of the chronically underemployed, such as those
discriminated against because of race, gender, ethnicity, religion,
disability, sexual orientation, drug or alcohol dependency, homelessness,
or history of incarceration; use and treatment of micro-distributors;
contribution to national and local economic development; partnerships
with local organizations such as cooperative groups or chambers of
commerce; advocacy for better social or environmental industry standards;
paid leave for charitable work for employees; and other, similar topics.44
The environmental section of the BIA awards points for companies
that reduce their environmental footprint all along the supply chain.45 This
40. See B Impact Assessment Spreadsheet V. 5 (Feb. 1, 2016) (on file with the author) [hereinafter
Assessment Spreadsheet].
41. See Assessment Overview, supra note 17.
42. See Assessment Spreadsheet, supra note 40.
43. See Assessment Overview, supra note 17.
44. See Assessment Spreadsheet, supra note 40.
45. See Assessment Overview, supra note 17.
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category also consists of ways the company is directly benefitting the
world, in this case by reducing the harm done to the environment through
the production process. This section inquires about the amount of carbon
offset by the company’s environmental practices; the extent to which solid
waste from any manufacturing processes are recycled, reused, or
composted; the percentage of energy used that comes from renewable
sources; the percentage of manufacturing facilities that meet green
building standards; whether the company annually measures and reports
its energy and water usage, carbon emissions, and waste; whether the
company has reviewed the life cycle impact of its products; efforts to
reduce water usage in manufacturing; efforts to reduce use of toxic
chemicals in manufacturing; the extent to which the distribution system
involves clean emission vehicles; ways in which the product or service
itself might benefit the environment, whether through education,
measurement, or direct environmental impact as through conservation or
production of clean energy; and other, similar questions.46
For companies that are seeking B Corp certification—but not for
those benefit corporations who are merely using the BIA as a third-party
standard to satisfy the statutory disclosure requirements—B Lab requires
companies to submit supporting documentation for a random selection of
questions.47 This requirement applies not only to the initial application for
certification but also to every application for recertification.48 Companies
that wish to maintain their B Corp certification must apply for
recertification every other year.49 In addition, B Lab sometimes performs
a site review, which consists of facilities tours, employee interviews, and
more in-depth documentation requests.50 All publicly traded B Corps are
required to undergo a site review during every application for certification
or recertification, as are all companies that are wholly owned by a publicly
traded corporation.51 Otherwise, companies enter a lottery in which
approximately ten percent of all B Corps applying for certification or
recertification receive a site visit in any given year.52
To secure certification, a company must disclose its score in each of
the four impact areas on a public webpage.53 Publicly traded companies
and companies that are wholly owned by them must disclose their answers

46. See Assessment Spreadsheet, supra note 40.
47. See Osusky Interview, supra note 37.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See id.
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to every question (with some exceptions).54 Other certified companies are
rewarded with points for providing transparency such as this but are not
required to provide this level of detail.55
III. B LAB’S SCORE
The BIA represents a sincere and sophisticated attempt to create a
useful metric for profit-seeking companies. It scores well on each of the
four criteria of simplicity, validity, vision, and inclusivity. Nevertheless,
because these criteria are themselves in some tension, the BIA necessarily
sacrifices some criteria for others at various points. I will analyze each of
the criteria in turn, then conclude this section with some thoughts about
whether this is a context that is better described by reputational capital
theory or regulatory license theory.
A. Simplicity
The ideal tool to measure a company’s contributions to the world
would first and foremost be simple to use and understand. The various
constituent groups who might be interested in a company’s pro-social
rating will find that rating more useful the cheaper and easier it is. If the
rating system requires users to absorb dense documents akin to securities
filings, its audience will be considerably more limited than if the
information is communicated quickly and easily.
At first glance, the BIA seems to do a very good job of providing a
metric that is simple for investors, consumers, and suppliers to use without
careful parsing of complicated reports. The results are summarized in a
single number, with higher scores indicating companies that provide
greater social benefits than companies with lower scores. Although the
maximum score is 200, companies scoring 80 points or higher may receive
B Lab’s certification.56
The BIA awards points for answers that indicate a company has
pro-social policies or activities in one of its four impact areas. The test
does not subtract points for antisocial policies or activities. This focus on
the positive may present validity issues, as I will discuss below, but it does
have the virtue of adding to the test’s simplicity. Measuring the company’s
negative impact and designing a system that can somehow offset the
negative against the positive would make the system more complex.
Although the use of a single, all-encompassing score makes the BIA
seem admirably simple on its surface, the BIA is actually more
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. See How to Become a B Corp., supra note 13.
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complicated than it first appears, both for those who might rely on the
score and for the rated companies. This becomes apparent when we drill
down to how that core is calculated.
In the Council’s efforts to tailor the BIA to companies of different
sizes, from different industries, and from countries at different stages of
economic development, much of the BIA’s simplicity was unfortunately
lost. As a result, it is not really possible to compare companies’
contributions to society simply on the basis of their total BIA score. For
example, a company that employs 10,000 people and earns a score of 100
on the BIA likely impacts the world much more substantially than a
company that employs two people but has a BIA score of 140. For
interested parties to use the BIA score effectively, they must look deeper.
The score is a useful way to compare companies within the same category,
but there are seventy-two categories. The score is only illuminating when
we are, say, comparing two agricultural companies, each of which
employs around a thousand people and both of which operate in developed
countries. To compare one of these companies to a manufacturing
company, or an agricultural company in a developing economy, it is not
really possible to use only the final BIA score, even if the companies are
of similar size.
The problem is not only that different companies with the same score
may have vastly different impacts on the world but also that the scores
themselves are compiled differently. The identical BIA question may be
allocated different weightings based on the company’s category. There
may be good reasons for this difference, rooted in an effort to make the
BIA evaluation more valid. But, this effort to improve the BIA’s validity
imposes a serious cost to the test’s simplicity.
In order to compare a company to another that falls into a different
one of the BIA’s seventy-two categories, it is necessary to look at the
answers to the assessment’s individual questions. But few companies are
required to grant access to this level of information. The Model Act does
require benefit corporations to provide the public with an “assessment of
the overall social and environmental performance of the benefit
corporation against a third-party standard.”57 They must also disclose their
rationale for selecting the standard they chose.58 But, benefit corporations
have enormous latitude in designing the precise content of their benefit
reports, and this discretion extends to the detail they provide in assessing
their performance against a third-party standard. In addition, not all
companies certified by B Lab are benefit corporations. The benefit

57. See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 401(a)(2) (2016).
58. See id. § 401(a)(1)(iv).
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corporation statute does not bind those that are ordinary corporations or
limited liability companies.
B Lab itself also imposes disclosure requirements on certified
companies. B Lab requires public companies and wholly owned
subsidiaries of public companies to provide their scores on every
question.59 Those who interact with certified public companies and wholly
owned subsidiaries, then, will have access to the detailed information
required to make reasonable comparisons. Other companies, however, are
only required to provide their total score and their subtotals for each
impact area.60 Even when this information is available, interpreting
companies’ answers and scores on the assessment is much more
complicated and time consuming than looking at a single score.
So far, I have focused on the experience of stakeholders outside the
company who wish to evaluate the business’s pro-social status. For them,
the BIA is a mixed bag; there is a simple, all-encompassing score
available, but it does not really provide much information, especially if the
goal is to compare companies of different sizes, in different industries, or
which operate in different sorts of economies. For the companies
themselves, the simplicity picture is considerably worse.
B Lab advertises that the assessment takes two to four hours to
complete.61 However, the amount of time it takes a company to complete
the assessment depends on the type of information the company typically
maintains in the ordinary course. For example, the BIA asks questions
about the amount of carbon that was offset by the company’s
environmental practices over the course of the previous twelve months.62
Some companies may track this information, but others may not. Even
companies that do track their carbon impact may not do so in a way that
easily lends itself to answering this question. A company may only track
its carbon impact retrospectively at the end of its fiscal year, and may not
be able to provide an accurate answer except at that time. Questions like
these may, therefore, require some work to research the answers.
Companies that have a lot of research to do may need more than the
estimated time to complete the BIA. In addition, companies that
participate in certain industries—microfinance, investing or investment
advising, or green building—must complete specific industry addenda.63
Once the company has completed the assessment, B Lab randomly
selects six to eight questions on which the company gave positive answers
59. See Osusky Interview, supra note 37.
60. See Osusky Interview, supra note 37.
61. See Performance Requirements, supra note 13.
62. See Assessment Spreadsheet, supra note 40.
63. See Assessment Overview, supra note 17.
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(answers that garnered points) for documentary support.64 The applicant
must provide evidence that supports its answers to these questions.65 For
some questions, this may be a simple process. Documenting the health care
plans provided to employees, for instance, should be quite straightforward.
But documenting the amount of carbon reduced by a company’s new,
more efficient product may be more complex, involving laboratory studies
of both the new product and the old, as well as studies that measure
whether both products perform in real-world conditions as they did in the
lab. Then there must be documentation of sales of the new product and
survey data of customers to document any changes in usage when they
replace the old product with the new. Some companies will have done this
research already in the ordinary course, as part of their marketing or
licensing process, but others may face this problem for the first time when
performing the assessment. It is possible that B Lab would not require
documentation as extensive as I am suggesting, but the gains made to the
simplicity goal there would be offset by losses to validity.
After a company has completed the BIA and uploaded the supporting
documentation, it must participate in an assessment review.66 The review
consists of a phone call with a B Lab staff member in which the staff
member will go over questions that companies may have found difficult
or unclear. B Lab says this phone call typically lasts sixty to ninety
minutes.67
Companies that qualify for certification after completing the
assessment review—that is, companies that score at least 80 points—must
submit still more documentation. B Lab will select several (one to six)
questions from the Business Impact Model portion of the BIA and ask for
additional documentation to support the positive (point garnering)
responses to those questions. B Lab may also ask for additional documents
to clarify companies’ answers.68
Companies must then complete an additional set of questions, the
Disclosure Questionnaire. This begins as a one-page document consisting
of a series of “yes-no” and “true-false” questions about fines, sanctions,
litigation, and any “sensitive” practices.69 Companies that have paid any
fines, been subject to any sanctions, or otherwise engaged in activities,
64. Id. According to Dan Osusky, B Lab sometimes targets more questions than this, with the
goal of evaluating 30%–50% of the questions that garnered a positive response.
65. Id.
66. See Performance Requirements, supra note 13.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. Disclosure Questionnaire, B LAB, http://www.bcorporation.net/sites/default/files/
documents/standards/B_Corp_DisclosureQuestionnaire-blank.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J9HS-YD8E]
[hereinafter Disclosure Questionnaire].
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practices, or suffered events B Lab deems problematic, must disclose these
issues on the company’s public Impact Report, describe how the company
has dealt with the issue, and demonstrate that management has taken steps
to ensure that the issue will not occur again.70 Companies engaged in
production or trade in illegal products, hard alcohol, commercial logging,
guns or other weapons, for example, fall into this must disclose and
explain category.71 Companies that have set up corporate structures to
minimize tax liability must also disclose and explain this behavior (though
apparently not if they minimized their taxes through other means). The
same applies to companies that conduct animal testing, employ workers
under the age of fifteen, require employees to work overtime, employ
prisoners, forbid collective bargaining, or own facilities near sensitive
ecosystems.72 The answers to these questions will not affect a company’s
score, but B Lab reserves the right to refuse certification “if the company
is ultimately deemed not to uphold the spirit of the community.”73
B Lab staff conduct background checks on companies that score over
80 points on the BIA to supplement the Disclosure Questionnaire. The
background check consists of a search of public records concerning the
company, its brand, and its executives. The results of the background
check may also result in a decision to deny certification.74
Even after a company has cleared all of these hurdles and obtained
certification, B Lab may select the company for a more in-depth
certification evaluation.75 Ten percent of all certified B companies are
chosen at random for this process each year, and certified companies that
are either publicly traded or wholly owned by a publicly traded company
are required to undergo certification evaluation once during every twoyear certification period.76 These evaluations involve more in-depth
documentation of a company’s responses on the BIA and may also include
facilities tours and employee interviews.77
To sum up BIA’s performance on the simplicity criterion, the single
score summary—and the four impact area scores—provide a very simple
method for users to determine a company’s pro-social impact. This sort of
one-dimensional metric works well in simpler contexts, such as city health
inspectors’ reports on restaurants’ cleanliness. But users of the BIA data
need much more nuanced information than restaurant customers do.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. Id.
74. See Performance Requirements, supra note 13.
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. See Osusky Interview, supra note 37.
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Investors, customers, communities, and employees will each care about
different aspects of the BIA report, even within a given impact area. The
summary score is simple, but it provides too little information to be terribly
useful.78
Many of those interested in a company’s pro-social performance will
need the detailed information that comes only from answers to individual
questions. For this audience, it is not clear that the point system adds much
value. As I will discuss below, the point system requires the Council to
establish a values system, and it is difficult to imagine any values system
that could be universally accepted. The Council’s system has the added
flaw that it lacks transparency; the Council has not articulated the
principles it uses to decide how to distribute point allocations among the
different categories based on which of the seventy-two boxes a company
occupies. This means that sophisticated users will still need to parse
individual questions rather than defer to the BIA’s scoring system. Only
causal users—such as consumers who may slightly prefer to buy products
made by pro-social companies—will find the summary scores useful.
Users with more sophisticated needs, such as investors, communities, and
even some customers, will need to look much more closely. B Lab does
sell access to some detailed information through its analytics program, but
this information is anonymized unless a company consents to revealing its
particular answers.79 For many certified companies, this more detailed
information will not be available; so, for the more sophisticated users, the
utility of the entire system is doubtful.
B. Validity
Simplicity is important because if the measure is too complex, it is
possible that no one will use it. At least equally important is that the
measure be valid—that it accurately measures the characteristics that users
care about.
Validity is in tension with simplicity. To see why this is so, it may
be helpful to compare assessments to theoretical models. The closer a
model is to reality, the more complex it is and, therefore, the less useful.
A simple model more often provides clear lessons but is easily
78. Note that a recent empirical study of restaurant health ratings brought the utility of even these
measures into serious question. Daniel Ho examined more than 700,000 restaurant inspections across
ten different cities. He concluded that there was little evidence that the scores were valid; that is, a
high score on one inspection did not predict a similarly high score on a subsequent inspection, nor did
the implementation of scoring regimes demonstrably improve public health. See generally Ho, supra
note 19. Even in a simple context such as restaurant health ratings, there may be necessary trade-offs
between simplicity and validity. I am indebted to Elizabeth Pollman for bringing this study to my
attention.
79. See B Analytics, B LAB, http://b-analytics.net/ [https://perma.cc/33LK-PDSJ].
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manipulated. A complicated model is more accurate but much harder to
design and use and is less likely to provide clear policy recommendations.
An assessment is like a model. Assessments of pro-social behavior
attempt to develop an algorithm for what actions and policies count as
beneficial and then apply that algorithm to real companies. A simple
assessment is easy to use and understand, such as an assessment evaluating
companies based on whether they offer health insurance to their
employees. The simplest version of that assessment would credential any
company that offered its employees any health insurance plan. Although
this assessment model is very simple, it is not very valid. If any health plan
will suffice, then companies that offer complete coverage will be ranked
the same as companies that pay for only catastrophic illnesses. Companies
whose plan has no deductible will be placed on the same level as those
whose plan requires families to pay the first several thousand dollars of
expenses out of pocket. Additionally, companies that do not reimburse
insureds for contraception or abortion services will appear identical to
those that do.
On the other end of the spectrum, a valid and complex assessment
risks rendering the assessment useless to all but the most sophisticated
readers. For example, a health care assessment could provide the entire
text of the health insurance policy. This assessment would be highly valid
as an explanation of the health care the company provides but would be
the opposite of simple.
Using just the summary score is the simplest use of the BIA and,
therefore, the use that seems likely to be the most popular. This section
will, for that reason, focus on the score’s validity. Note, though, that at
least some certified companies are required to provide much more detailed
information about their BIA responses. For these companies, the validity
concerns outlined below are more muted.
The summary score provides a single number, as though companies’
positive impact on society could be ranked linearly, with companies that
earned higher scores unambiguously better for society than those with
lower scores. But this is a deeply problematic notion as applied to the BIA
for at least five reasons: scale independence, lack of uniformity, failure to
deduct for negative impact, interchangeability of categories, and
inadequate verification. I will discuss each of these in turn.
1. Scale Independence
An accurate assessment of a company’s positive social impact should
take scale into account. A company that puts solar panels on a million
homes has a much larger effect on the world than one that puts solar panels
on a thousand homes. But that is not how the BIA works. The BIA score
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does not award more points for companies that are larger, holding all else
equal. The questions and point allocations do change based on the size of
the company, as measured by the number of employees, but the BIA does
not reward companies for being larger and having a greater impact on
society. As a result, a company that employs a thousand former convicts
could have a lower score than a similar company that employs only ten.
Thus, for an outside investor, consumer, or community trying to decide
how to allocate their investment, consumption, or tax dollars, the score
alone is potentially misleading and could produce a misallocation of
resources.
One possible explanation for the Council’s decision to structure the
BIA as scale independent, in this sense, may be purely pragmatic.
Questions aimed at larger companies may not be sensible when asked of
smaller companies. For example, it seems ludicrous to ask a company
without employees about its employee benefits. Another possible
explanation is that the Council decided that it wanted the BIA to measure
how virtuous a company is and not how much good it actually achieves.
Perhaps the BIA is intended to measure social good achieved per person
employed, rather than the absolute amount of good provided. There is
some value to this sort of measure that the BIA provides; an assessment
tool that tried to do otherwise might produce bizarre results. For example,
if a company the size of Walmart reduced its greenhouse gas emissions by
one percent, an assessment tool that measured total social good produced
would report the company as a much more environmentally friendly
company than a local installer of geothermal power, even if the company’s
business model and other practices were not at all pro-social. Still, the BIA
ought to make some effort to capture the scale effect as well as a
company’s virtuous nature. One way to do this might be a separate
measure for the total volume of benefits provided to society. Precise
measurements in this area would likely be impossible, but a rough
indicator might be the company’s virtue index multiplied by some size
factor. This sort of measure could be performed for each of the BIA’s
impact areas to provide a more comprehensive sense of what types of
benefits a company is providing. This additional metric would add
complexity relative to the attractive simplicity of a single,
all-encompassing number; but if the single number’s appearance of
including every aspect of a company’s pro-social behavior is illusory, as I
argue in this section, it might be worthwhile to sacrifice some degree of
simplicity to capture the impact of a company’s scale.
One further note on scale—the number of employees may not be the
most useful way for the BIA to measure a company’s size. It is helpful for
determining the impact of a company’s employment policies, such as
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flexible work schedules, maternity or paternity leave, and generosity of
benefits; however, it may not capture the company’s impact in other areas.
For example, a company may have relatively few employees yet have an
enormous impact in lobbying for social change or developing a cleaner,
cheaper, more sustainable energy source. Different measures of size,
therefore, may be necessary depending on the type of benefit that is being
measured.
2. Lack of Uniformity
Besides the issue of scale, there are a number of other ways in which
the BIA fails to treat like companies alike. Companies from different
industries are provided with different questions. Even when companies are
asked the same question, the answers are sometimes scaled differently, so
that the same answer garners a different number of points. For example,
one question on the BIA asks, “Is there an annual conflict of interest
questionnaire filled out by all board members and officers?”80 Companies
from developed economies with 50 to 999 employees can earn .2 points if
they answer this question positively,81 while companies of the same size
and in the same industries but in emerging economies can earn .4 points
(twice the score) from a positive answer.82
These discrepancies may result for a number of reasons. The impact
area may have been assigned a different number of points based on the
category involved.83 Alternatively, even if the impact area as a whole has
been assigned the same number of points, the impact area may contain a
different number of questions based on the category so that the same
number of points must be divided among a different number of questions.84
Because companies that fall into different categories are rated
differently, the BIA is not terribly useful for making comparisons between
companies. This is not only a problem for simplicity, as discussed above
but also a challenge to the BIA’s validity. A score of 80 points on the
BIA—which qualifies a company for B Lab certification—means
something different for companies in different categories. To be valid, the
score should measure what users of the measure want it to measure. But if
the score measures different things for different companies, the score can
be valid only if these variations comport to broader principles that users
embrace.

80. See Assessment Spreadsheet, supra note 40.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See Osusky Interview, supra note 37.
84. See id.
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The BIA may be varying its point structure according to underlying
principles, but it is difficult to come to any firm conclusions based on the
information B Lab and the Council have disclosed. Questions that are
extremely important to determine some companies’ environmental
responsibility, for example, may be completely pointless to ask of others.
The BIA quite rightly asks agricultural companies what percentage of the
fertilizer they use is organic.85 But it would add little value to ask that same
question of a service or manufacturing company. Similarly, the monitoring
of the output of hazardous and toxic wastewater may matter a great deal
to a manufacturing company’s profile but not to that of a retail sales
operation.86 As B Lab states in explaining this approach, “For each impact
area and goal, weightings and indicators are adaptive to the material issues
for that particular business based on their size, sector, and market.”87
In this sense, it may not be feasible to have a metric that permits
perfect comparisons across industries, sizes, or markets. Perhaps including
questions that are tailored to the relevant segment is worth the sacrifice in
comparability. Still, at a minimum, B Lab could apply some labeling to
highlight this fact and make it clear that a score of 80 for a ten-person
service provider in the United States means something different from an
identical score earned by an agricultural cooperative in Brazil with five
thousand employees. A simple three-letter code for each category
indicating where the company falls could achieve this easily and cheaply.
A code like this would remind users that the scores are not fit for
intercompany comparisons except within categories and it would tell them
where to look if they do want to make such comparisons. Even if a perfect
comparison is not available, comparing two medium-sized agricultural
companies may be better than comparing two companies with no
overlapping categories.
Also, the Council should provide greater transparency about the
underlying principles it applies in allocating points based on a company’s
category. Even if the Council does not wish to disclose the detailed
breakdown (though this would be ideal), the more important disclosure is
really the rules it is using. Disclosure of these rules would grant users a
much clearer sense of the scores’ meaning.
3. Failure to Deduct
A corporation’s impact on society is the result not only of the positive
impacts of its actions but also of any negative effects from its conduct. A
company that trains unemployed workers in new skills to help them find
85. See Assessment Spreadsheet, supra note 40.
86. See id.
87. Assessment Overview, supra note 17.
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jobs may also treat its own employees poorly. A valid assessment should,
therefore, take into account both the positive and negative impacts of a
company’s behavior in order to arrive at an overall understanding of the
company’s influence for good or for ill.
The BIA scoring methodology, however, counts only the positive.
As B Lab states, “All indicators represent the positive impact of a
company, and are intended to exceed universal business norms. There are
no negative points in the assessment.”88 A company could, therefore, score
well on the BIA despite engaging in powerfully negative behaviors whose
impact outweighed its positive actions.
The Council did include a safeguard to guard against credentialing
some such companies. All companies applying for B Lab certification
must complete a separate disclosure questionnaire aimed at uncovering
applicants’ negative conduct.89 A company that employed forced labor or
had been convicted of violating important domestic laws could be barred
from certification despite scoring over 80 points on the BIA.90
Barring a company from certification is a binary solution and,
therefore, is inadequate as a means of incorporating a company’s negative
actions into the assessment of its social impact. Companies whose negative
activity does not rise to a level sufficient to warrant denial of certification
escape without consequence for their bad behavior on the BIA. Also,
because denial of certification may seem harsh in many cases, B Lab may
prove reluctant to impose bans except in relatively extreme cases. B Lab
also has the option of requiring disclosure of negative activity or of asking
the applicant to remediate the issue, but enforcement of these lesser steps
depends ultimately on the threat of denial of certification, which may not
prove credible in many cases.
In addition, neither B Lab nor the Council has provided detailed
information about what sorts of conduct may warrant a denial of
certification. Without greater transparency, the threat of a ban will have
little deterrent effect; when companies are unaware that a particular action
could lead to losing the opportunity to become a certified B corporation,
they will not take that possibility into account when deciding on their
future conduct.
Deducting points for behavior that harms society is a complicated
undertaking. To add this feature to the BIA, the Council would have to
develop complex standards tied to companies’ size, industry, and the
development status of their home countries. Such standards would be
difficult to design and complicated to explain, justify, and enforce, greatly
88. Id. (note omitted).
89. See id. at note 1.
90. See Osusky Interview, supra note 37.
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undermining the simplicity goal. They also would risk offending
companies that use the BIA or seek certification by penalizing behavior
that some companies feel are acceptable or even beneficial. But these are
the same barriers that the Council had to overcome to create the BIA’s
measurements of companies’ positive behaviors. So, these obstacles are a
poor explanation for refusing to take the same plunge in evaluating
negative behavior as the Council did in evaluating positive behavior.
It seems critical to add this feature to the BIA if the scores are to meet
the validity goal. Users of the BIA are almost certainly interested in
companies’ net impact on society—both the ways companies help and
harm the world; leaving out the negative half of this equation seems an
odd decision that greatly undermines the BIA’s utility. Taking negative
conduct into account would allow the BIA score to better reflect
companies’ social impact and avoid the problems inherent with the current
binary system, in which the Council’s only option is to deny certification
for companies that exceed some (undisclosed) level of negative behavior.
4. Interchangeability of Categories
Investors, consumers, employees, and communities may care about
different aspects of a company’s pro-social profile. Some consumers may
focus exclusively on the company’s environmental policies, while some
communities may be most interested in how a company treats its workers.
Many might want to know about every aspect of a company’s behavior.
Even this last, more all-embracing group may feel troubled at the
prospect of equating one unit of environmental protection with one unit of
corporate governance, social mission, or worker protection. How many
tons of carbon can be released into the atmosphere in exchange for
providing better health care benefits for workers? How many workers can
be fired, paid substandard wages, or required to work under dangerous
conditions in order to provide one underprivileged child with free
computer programming lessons? How many independent directors on a
company’s board may be exchanged for helping one less homeless
veteran?
All businesses must make difficult decisions about trade-offs. Even
purely profit-driven enterprises must decide how much to invest in
developing a new product versus spending those same dollars marketing
the old one; they must balance hiring a first-rate and well-motivated
workforce with reducing costs to improve profit margins. Companies that
aim to achieve a social purpose while also earning a profit face an even
more complex task; they must balance each of their social goals against
each other and against the need to earn money. These decisions are an
inevitable part of being a pro-social enterprise; they cannot be avoided.
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Although there is no avoiding trade-offs like these, companies should
engage in these decisions self-consciously. They should form principles
which guide their behavior and which can be articulated to the various
stakeholder groups. These groups in turn can hold the company
accountable, even if only rhetorically, for implementing these principles
in good faith. In most cases, there probably can be no mathematical
formula for how to trade one social good for another. Probably only
economists believe that all goods can be translated into dollar form, or
perhaps “utiles,”91 so that they can be exchanged based on some set ratio
or more complex utility function (and perhaps not even very many
economists believe this).92 But to say these decisions cannot be reduced to
precise formulae is not to say that there can be no principles at all. These
decisions are important to companies’ identity, mission, and culture and
should be made thoughtfully with that fact in mind.
The BIA also makes these trade-offs between categories of pro-social
behavior, but it does so implicitly, with no clear statement of how or why
it has drawn the equivalencies that it has. A point earned under the
governance impact area is worth precisely as much as one earned under
the environmental impact area. By deciding how many points each
positive answer to a question is worth, then, the Council is impliedly
saying that policies that garner the same number of points have equivalent
worth to the world. But neither B Lab nor the Council has articulated a set
of principles to explain why they have drawn the equivalences that they
have. For example, the following two questions are each worth 3.5 points
on the BIA:
Beyond those required by law, for what % of your projects do you
implement policies for monitoring and improving indoor air quality
during construction?93
What % of the company is owned by:: [sic] Women and/or
individuals from chronically-underemployed communities [sic]94

91. A “utile” is a nonmonetary unit of utility, invented by economists. See Frank B. Cross, In
Praise of Irrational Plaintiffs, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 23, n.142 (2000).
92. As Richard Schmalbeck explained:
The very phrase “surplus of pleasure over pain” suggests, however, that utilitarians are
concerned with a very broad range of human needs, including many for which there can be
no organized market, and no exchanges that can be valued in dollars, pounds, francs, hours
of labor, or other readily calculable measure. Economists sometimes refer to “utils,” or
“utiles,” as units of utility, but usually as a didactic device, not out of any notion that utility
can be precisely measured.
Richard Schmalbeck, The Justice of Economics: An Analysis of Wealth Maximization As a Normative
Goal, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 488, 496–97 (1983) (internal notes omitted).
93. See Assessment Spreadsheet, supra note 40.
94. See id.
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Policies to improve indoor air quality during construction are,
therefore, equivalently good for society, as measured by the BIA, to
having owners who are women and members of chronically
underemployed communities.
It is not at all obvious why those two characteristics should be
considered of equal worth. One could likely construct arguments favoring
one or the other, perhaps even by a substantial margin. But neither the
Council nor B Lab has provided any, even in general outline.
The same problem occurs within impact areas as between impact
areas, though to a somewhat lesser degree. That is, it may be somewhat
easier to understand why some characteristics are more important than
others within a given impact area, since the questions within an impact
area are aimed at a more or less uniform goal. Within the environmental
impact area, for example, the BIA’s questions attempt to ascertain the
company’s environmental responsibility. Still, even within an area, it
would be helpful to understand how the Council has decided to allocate its
points. For both between impact areas and within them, a statement of
general principles would go some distance, even without a detailed,
question-by-question explanation.
5. Inadequate Verification
Even an ideal assessment tool is worth little if companies are free to
lie in responding to the questions. To ensure an assessment is valid,
therefore, there must be some mechanism that confirms companies’
responses are reasonably accurate. Otherwise, the information provided by
the assessment will prove essentially meaningless, and the resulting
certification will not be taken seriously.
Publicly traded companies solve this problem in reporting their
financial information by paying for outside auditors. Large accounting
firms examine companies’ documents and validate the information
disclosed in the companies’ public filings. In addition, public companies
face liability under the securities laws,95 and their senior executives face
potential criminal charges for purposefully distorting the information
provided.96
Benefit corporations that are privately held have far fewer legal
safeguards to ensure that they are providing the public benefits they claim.
The Model Act requires benefit corporations to produce and disclose on
their websites an annual benefit report that describes the general and
specific public benefits they provide.97 But there is no provision in the
95. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (Rule 10b-5).
96. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 302, 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (2012).
97. See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 401 (2016).
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Model Act imposing liability for providing false information in the benefit
report. Stakeholders could conceivably sue under state fraud laws to
remedy any false statements, but only if they could prove they were
harmed by the fraud.98 Perhaps an investor who was defrauded into making
a substantial investment in the company by fraud in the benefit report
might have a sufficient injury for a cost-effective fraud action, or perhaps
such an action could be prosecuted on behalf of consumers as a class
action, but the damages in both cases could be difficult to ascertain.
Moreover, the Model Act does not require external audits to ensure that
benefit reports are accurate.99
B Lab does have some measures to ensure the information companies
provide on the BIA is accurate for companies seeking or maintaining B
Corp certification. B Lab requires companies to submit documentation to
support their responses to some randomly selected questions at both the
initial certification and every recertification.100 There is also the disclosure
questionnaire and the background check, discussed above, and a public
complaint process. In addition, B Lab performs a more in-depth review of
ten percent of certified companies each year and of all publicly traded
certified companies, as well as those companies that are wholly owned by
publicly traded companies.101
These measures pale by comparison to the protections that exist for
publicly traded companies in their financial disclosures and are likely to
prove inadequate. Even those companies selected for certification
evaluation will find the process sparse compared to a formal audit; B Lab
estimates the process takes only six to ten hours.102
Perhaps, though, there is little point in adding more elaborate
safeguards. Despite all the protections that guard against misstated
financial reports by public companies, public companies are sometimes
discovered to have misstated their financial performance.103 Auditors

98. One of the elements of a fraud claim is that the plaintiff suffered damages as a result of the
fraud. See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 192 (1963)
(intent and injury are essential elements of common law fraud).
99. See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 401(c) (2016) (“Neither the benefit report nor the
assessment of the performance of the benefit corporation in the benefit report required by subsection
(a)(2) needs to be audited or certified by a third party.”).
100. See Performance Requirements, supra note 13.
101. See id. Selecting a significant percentage of companies to audit at random may prove a costeffective method of ensuring that companies’ disclosures are truthful. I am grateful to Eman Al-Hassan
for this point.
102. See id.
103. See, e.g., Fly Leasing Addresses SEC Comments, Restates Financials, PR NEWSWIRE (May
2, 2016), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/fly-leasing-addresses-sec-comments-restatesfinancials-300261280.html [https://perma.cc/NJX6-G8G7] (NYSE-traded company restated financial
statements for two years to resolve dispute over proper accounting with the SEC). See generally,
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confirm the information disclosed to them comports with Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles, but they cannot assure that the financial
statements are entirely accurate and free of fraudulent misstatements. The
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board’s standards require only
“reasonable assurance” of a financial statement’s accuracy by outside
auditors.104 As § 1015.10 states:
The exercise of due professional care allows the auditor to
obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements
are free of material misstatement, whether caused by error or fraud,
or whether any material weaknesses exist as of the date of
management’s assessment. Absolute assurance is not attainable
because of the nature of audit evidence and the characteristics of
fraud. Although not absolute assurance, reasonable assurance is a
high level of assurance. Therefore, an audit conducted in accordance
with the standards of the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board (United States) may not detect a material weakness in internal
control over financial reporting or a material misstatement to the
financial statements.105

The Model Act does require benefit corporations to publicize their
benefit reports on their respective websites.106 Such disclosure may allow
verification by the crowd to the extent false information can be detected
without inside access to corporate information. For now, perhaps this
should suffice. Requiring additional measures would add to the expense
and complication of becoming a certified B Corp and might discourage
companies from doing so. Unless and until fraud becomes a significant
problem, the cost of adding safeguards seems to outweigh the likely
benefits.
C. Vision
An assessment of a company’s pro-social impact needs to embody
some underlying vision of what it means for a profit-seeking company to
help society. In other words, there needs to be a coherent expression of
what the assessment is trying to measure. One can imagine many different
perspectives on what social missions are important, as well as different
weightings even among those who agree on the fundamental goals. Some
Michal Barzuza & David C. Smith, What Happens in Nevada? Self-Selecting into Lax Law, 27 REV.
FIN. STUD. 3593 (2014) (comparing financial restatements of Nevada and Delaware firms).
104. AS 1015.10: Due Professional Care in the Performance of Work, PUB. CO. ACCT.
OVERSIGHT BOARD, https://pcaobus.org/Standards/Auditing/Pages/AS1015.aspx [https://perma.cc/
RQ94-U3T9].
105. Id. This version of the rule is effective as of December 31, 2016, but the prior (current as
of this writing) version is materially similar.
106. See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 402 (2016).
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might argue that environmental responsibility is most critical, while others
might see worker empowerment, corporate governance, or another social
mission as particularly vital. Because different stakeholders have different
preferences, to be useful, an assessment must explain the individual vision
underlying its evaluation metric so that users will know which assessment
to choose.
B Lab provides statements of its goals, which can be interpreted as
its—or the Council’s—guiding vision for the BIA, in two places on its
website. Under the heading, “Why B Corps Matter,” B Lab’s website
states:
Individually, B Corps meet the highest standards of verified social
and environmental performance, public transparency, and legal
accountability, and aspire to use the power of markets to solve social
and environmental problems.
Collectively, B Corps lead a growing global movement of people
using business as a force for goodTM. Through the power of their
collective voice, one day all companies will compete to be best for
the worldTM, and society will enjoy a more shared and durable
prosperity for all.107

The first paragraph indicates that certified B Corps are socially and
environmentally responsible, transparent to the public about their conduct,
and legally accountable. These are vision statements, but they suffer from
some significant problems.
The first paragraph’s overarching vision is a conglomerate of five
visions:
social
performance,
environmental
performance,
transparency/verification, legal accountability, and implementation of a
social mission. These five visions are in some tension, yet this is not
acknowledged. For example, older technology may require more workers
to operate it (which is good for workers and fulfills the social performance
goal), but new technology may be cleaner (which is better for the
environment and fulfills the environmental performance goal). Legal
accountability and transparency may together lead to liability, which will
sap the company’s ability to perform its social mission. The first paragraph
does not indicate which of these principles should trump the others when
they conflict.
Also, it is far from clear that the BIA comports with the paragraph’s
expressed vision. For example, it is unclear what the “highest standards”
of social and environmental performance are. However, even if we assume
that the BIA’s questions reflect those standards, companies can achieve
107. Why B Corps Matter, B LAB, https://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps/why-b-corpsmatter [https://perma.cc/6Y79-M4MN].
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certification while adopting only a portion of them—enough to earn 80
points on a 200-point scale.108 Also, as explained above, the certification
process’s verification portion leaves much to be desired.109 Public
transparency also could be much stronger; certification requires only quite
limited transparency for most companies, though greater transparency is
rewarded with a higher BIA score.110 Finally, neither the Model Act nor
the rules governing B Corps impose any significant legal liability on a
certified company, which would seem to be a requirement for “legal
accountability.”111
The second paragraph articulates laudable goals, but is so broad that
it is hard to discern much substantive guidance. Business should be used
as a force for good, where “good” seems to be defined as “a more shared
and durable prosperity.” This prosperity should be “for all,” which seems
a more ambitious version of the earlier statement that it be more widely
shared. But how should businesses achieve this new, more widespread and
more durable prosperity? And what is “prosperity”? Is it limited to greater
access to material goods? That seems inconsistent with B Lab’s
environmental goals, which often require people to use less, not more,
material and energy. Like the first paragraph, there is a sense of a vision
here, but the way it is expressed makes it difficult to implement.
The other expression of a vision on B Lab’s website is its
“Declaration of Interdependence.”112 The Declaration begins by repeating
the second paragraph’s ambition that business be used as a force for good
and that the benefits companies produce should be distributed to all
stakeholders, not just the companies’ owners.113 It then goes on to list what
B Corps believe:
That we must be the change we seek in the world.
That all business ought to be conducted as if people and place
mattered.
That, through their products, practices, and profits, businesses should
aspire to do no harm and benefit all.

108. See How to Become a B Corp., supra note 13.
109. See supra notes 97–106 and accompanying text.
110. See Assessment Spreadsheet, supra note 40.
111. See Michael B. Dorff, Why Public Benefit Corporations?, 42 DEL. J. CORP. L., 21–28
(forthcoming 2017).
112. Declaration of Interdependence, B LAB, https://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps/
the-b-corp-declaration [https://perma.cc/7ACD-ELKG].
113. See id.
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To do so requires that we act with the understanding that we are each
dependent upon another and thus responsible for each other and
future generations.114

Like the two paragraphs that explain why B Corps matter, the
Declaration embraces heartwarming rhetoric but does not provide much
practical guidance for those trying to implement a coherent vision.
Exhorting companies to “be the change” is an inspirational instruction to
take personal responsibility for implementing a vision, but it is not itself a
vision; it provides no substantive directions as to what sort of change one
should be.
The statement that companies should act as though “people and place
mattered” is a bit cryptic. People are important, but which people and for
what ends? The statement could refer to workers, customers, surrounding
communities, or all fellow travelers on the planet. Each of these meanings
would dictate very different strategies for acting as though people
mattered.
Place is even more mysterious. This could be read as an
admonishment to avoid outsourcing, though it is far from clear that is what
was intended. If so, the admonishment needs greater explication. Banning
outsourcing requires a company to prioritize the needs of the local
community over those of people who live far away. If all humans have
equal dignity and worth, then this exhortation seems of dubious moral
value, especially if those to whom the work would be outsourced suffer
from far greater poverty and/or live in countries with far less
comprehensive safety nets than those whose jobs are being shipped
overseas. Also, in some cases the local community will not be the best
place to produce a product from an environmental perspective, perhaps
because the local environment is more sensitive than elsewhere. If so,
should environmental concerns trump concerns about place? Finally, a ban
on outsourcing seems to contradict the goal of a more widely shared
prosperity.
Aspiring to do no harm and benefit all laudably echoes Hippocrates’
admonition to physicians to “do no harm.”115 Unfortunately, all economic
activity necessarily does some harm. Manufacturing solar panels will
reduce greenhouse gas emissions and combat global warming,
114. Id.
115. See HIPPOCRATES, ON EPIDEMICS 9 (The Perfect Library 2015) (“The physician must be
able to tell the antecedents, know the present, and foretell the future—must mediate these things, and
have two special objects in view with regard to disease, to do good or to do no harm.”). Although a
common misconception, this phrase is not part of the Hippocratic Oath. See Lisa L. Dahm, Medical
Futility and the Texas Medical Futility Statute: A Model to Follow or One to Avoid?, 20 No. 6 HEALTH
L. 25 at n.13 (2008).
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commendable results that on balance should benefit the world. But the
manufacturing process is not harm-free. Manufacturing goods requires the
use of raw materials, which in turn often requires mining or other
destructive methods to extract the raw materials from the planet’s crust.
Even if extraction could be achieved without environmental degradation,
manufacturing generally involves the use of nonrenewable raw materials
such as iron, gold, aluminum, rare earths, and petroleum. There are more
and less destructive manufacturing processes, but it is impossible to do no
harm at all while manufacturing goods. Similar arguments could be made
for agricultural activities and even the service industry.
Benefitting all also sounds unobjectionable, but is equally impossible
to implement. The category “all” presumably includes a company’s
competitors, workers, customers, and communities. Business in the U.S.
economy involves competition; we have developed an extensive body of
law to ensure that competition is the norm.116 A company trying to develop
a better or cheaper product does so in order to outsell the competition,
taking away its competitors’ customers for itself. The goal of benefitting
all seems inherently incompatible with a capitalist economy.
Finally, the reminder that we are dependent on one another and that
future generations depend on us is admirable and correct but not terribly
helpful in making concrete decisions. The point of highlighting our mutual
dependence seems very similar to the goal of companies benefitting all
through their economic activities and shares the same practical problems.
Intergenerational dependency fails to indicate what our obligations to
future generations are. One perspective might be that our obligation to our
grandchildren is to preserve as much of the planet’s natural resources as
possible. This would suggest that we limit economic activity so that we
minimize our use of nonrenewable raw materials. Another perspective
might suggest that we should maximize our grandchildren’s standard of
living. This goal would suggest the opposite approach, that we should
increase industry and capital as much as possible so that our grandchildren
can have lives that are more materially comfortable than our own. We
should care about each other and about our descendants, but what actions
does this admonition dictate? A coherent vision statement should guide us
in making these decisions, not just provide an emotional framework.
There is a limit to how much guidance a vision statement can be
expected to provide. The point of a vision statement is to indicate an
overall sense of the assessment’s goals and philosophy, not to dictate the
outcome of every minute decision. Still, to be helpful, the vision statement
116. See State Oil Co. v. Kahn, 522 U.S. 3, 7 (1997) (“Under §1 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat.
209, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1, ‘[e]very contract, combination . . ., or conspiracy, in restraint of trade’
is illegal.”).
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must consist of more than just platitudes, and when aspects of the vision
are in tension, it should provide some sense of how to resolve conflicts
when they arise. Examples of forms this guidance could take include a
hierarchy of principles, mandatory minimum requirements for each
principle that cannot be subverted, or a Rawlsian maximin principle.117
There is no doubt that many other possibilities exist, but a vision statement
that endorses more than one value should provide some method of
resolving conflicts.
D. Inclusivity
An assessment that is simple, valid, and embodies a clear vision
would still be pointless if no one used it. To achieve broad utilization, the
assessment’s vision must be popular. Popularity could result from
espousing narrow views that are widely held, or it could be achieved with
a more ecumenical strategy of accepting a wide range of principles. Much
depends on the size and viewpoints of the target audience.
The Model Act imposes the outer limits on how expansive an
assessment’s vision may be, but these outer limits are very broad. The
Model Act defines both “general public benefit” and “specific public
benefit.”118 Every benefit corporation under the Model Act must provide a
general public benefit and has the option of providing a specific public
benefit.119
The Model Act defines “general public benefit” as “[a] material
positive impact on society and the environment, taken as a whole, assessed
against a third-party standard, from the business and operations of a
benefit corporation.”120 Leaving aside the drafting oddity that included the
requirement for a third-party standard in the definition, the definition
imposes very few substantive requirements. Benefit corporations must
produce a substantial and beneficial effect on “society.” The Model Act
does not specify what counts as a “positive impact,” nor does it delineate
the limits of whose interests count as part of “society,” leaving these terms
as blank slates to be filled in by benefit corporations and the creators of
third-party assessments. The definition does require, however, that benefit
corporations help the environment as well as society; companies that wish
to focus only on helping people and not places must find some other form
of business organization.
117. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 133 (rev. ed. 1999) (“The maximin rule tells us to
rank alternatives by their worst possible outcomes: we are to adopt the alternative the worst outcome
of which is superior to the worst outcomes of the others.”).
118. See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 102 (2016).
119. See id. § 201.
120. Id. § 102.
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Benefit corporations also have the option of adopting a “specific
public benefit.” The definition of “specific public benefit” is similarly
broad:
(1) providing low-income or underserved individuals or communities
with beneficial products or services;
(2) promoting economic opportunity for individuals or communities
beyond the creation of jobs in the normal course of business;
(3) protecting or restoring the environment;
(4) improving human health;
(5) promoting the arts, sciences, or advancement of knowledge;
(6) increasing the flow of capital to entities with a purpose to benefit
society or the environment; and
(7) conferring any other particular benefit on society or the
environment.121

One oddly absent category is religion. Religion is included as a
permissible public purpose for nonprofit organizations that wish to qualify
for tax-deductible contributions under IRC § 501(c)(3), yet it was not
included in the Model Act.122 It is unclear why religion was not specifically
listed here, but it would seem to fit under the very broad catchall provision
in paragraph (7).
For both the general and specific public benefits, then, the Model Act
is highly permissive. The third-party assessments have tremendous
latitude to shape their visions of what should count as a benefit to society
or the environment with very few concrete limitations. To see just how
inclusive the statutory definition is, imagine a company that develops and
manufactures new televisions with improved image quality, and that this
company also donates a small percentage of its profits to an organization
that works to clean pollution from the world’s oceans. Such an
organization is providing a public benefit and would qualify—assuming it
met the Model Act’s other requirements—to form as a benefit corporation.
It provides a benefit to society—better televisions—and delivers a
material benefit to the environment through its donations. It would also
qualify as providing a specific benefit under paragraph five, because the
company promotes the sciences and the advancement of knowledge
through its research to create better televisions. A third-party assessment
could be similarly inclusive if it so chose.

121. Id.
122. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (listing “religious” purposes as acceptable).

548

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 40:515

Note also that the catchall provision could include sharply
controversial missions. An organization that worked to ban all abortions
would count as providing a benefit to society by some people’s lights, as
would an organization that attempted to provide free and legal abortions
to all who needed one. Other than its emphasis on environmental benefits,
the statute is apolitical.
In some ways, the BIA has taken advantage of the range of
possibilities furnished by the Model Act. The BIA awards points in four
impact areas: governance, workers, community, and the environment.123
The BIA thus embraces a broad vision of what counts as a positive impact
on society.
At the same time, the BIA imposes its vision on users of its
assessment and does not provide much flexibility. Companies cannot
become certified B Corps by excelling in only one of the four impact areas
and abandoning the other three.124 They must achieve at least some points
in each of the four areas if they expect to have a realistic chance of earning
80 points and qualifying for certification.125 In this way, although the
BIA’s vision is broad in that it encompasses a number of different types
of positive impacts on society, it is also quite restrictive in that it requires
companies that aspire to certification to pursue all of these areas.
Companies do retain considerable flexibility, though, in deciding which
areas to emphasize.
The other way the BIA is less inclusive than it might be is that it
awards points based on some activities that not all would agree should
count as a benefit to society. I should note that these are largely the
exception; the vast majority of the BIA’s judgments about what counts as
beneficial to society or the environment are unlikely to prove
controversial. But there are a few categories that seem potentially
problematic. For example, the BIA awards points to companies that
emphasize use of locally sourced parts.126 Sourcing locally may provide
environmental benefits by reducing the need for transportation, but it may
also result in producing goods in environmentally sensitive locations.
Also, because this question is asked of companies in emerging economies,
it may help with local economic development. On the other hand, local
sourcing may deprive workers in other countries from badly needed jobs
and may result in higher costs if local production is inefficient. Plus,
companies that pay more for local inputs than they would for imported
substitutes will have fewer resources available to pursue their social
123. See Assessment Overview, supra note 17.
124. See Osusky Interview, supra note 37.
125. See id.
126. See Assessment Spreadsheet, supra note 40, question IBM11.3.
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missions. Some companies might reasonably conclude that buying local is
not, on balance, pro-social.
Another example is that the BIA rewards companies for granting
board seats to certain stakeholder representatives, such as members of the
local community, customers, environmental experts, and nonexecutive
employees.127 Sometimes having such representatives can provide
valuable advice and perspective to a benefit corporation as it attempts to
balance its various goals. Other times, though, it may lead to co-option of
the company by one group at the expense of others or of the company’s
broader social purpose. A local community representative might advocate
for an expansion of the local manufacturing plant to improve the local
economy, as might a representative of the employees. The expansion
might come at the expense of the local environment, though, and so
contradict the company’s environmental mission. Granting stakeholders a
voice also risks creating dissension and paralysis as groups advocate for
their particular interests. Some companies might reasonably prefer to
avoid giving voting seats on the board to stakeholder representatives for
these reasons.
That the BIA makes some controversial choices is largely inevitable.
The vision goal and the inclusivity goal are necessarily in conflict. The
stronger the vision, the more groups are likely to be excluded because they
disagree with it. Conversely, having a “big tent” philosophy that includes
all visions of what should count as a benefit to society, as the Model Act
largely does, risks watering down the vision so much that the assessment
ends up standing for nothing at all.
The balance struck by the BIA seems quite reasonable. The BIA
rewards a wide array of possible social benefits, yet still provides some
sense that it has an overarching vision of what benefit corporations should
do. The fact that the BIA’s position is reasonable, though, does not mean
its choices will be appropriate for all benefit corporations. There remains
a strong need for competing assessment tools that promote alternative
visions to meet the needs of companies whose strategies do not fit well
with the choices made by the BIA.
The disadvantage of having multiple third-party assessment tools is
that it becomes harder to compare and evaluate companies when they are
measured by different metrics. As I argued above, however, even among
companies that use the BIA, intercompany comparisons are difficult and
likely inappropriate for companies that do not happen to fall into the same
subcategory out of the seventy-two different possibilities. Perhaps, then,

127. See id., question GV2.3a.
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having a variety of third-party assessments would not require much
sacrifice in comparability.
Competing assessment tools might also face a “race to the bottom”
problem.128 The assessment’s authors might water them down in order to
induce benefit corporations to use them. The competition’s result might
then be, not a range of different but equally valid visions, but rather
pressure to make the assessment as easy to pass as possible. When
assessments are offered for free, as the BIA is, the incentive to attract users
by weakening standards seems attenuated. Still, this is a danger worth
monitoring if other entities develop competing assessments.
E. Reputational Capital v. Regulatory License
When sellers have information that buyers lack about the unusually
high quality of their goods or services, it is to the sellers’ advantage to
convey that information to the buyers. Buyers who know that a seller’s
products are unusually good will often be willing to pay more for them.
Sometimes, though, it is expensive or impossible for a seller to convey this
information in a way that will be believed by buyers. In such cases,
economic theory holds that sellers will invest in their reputations or post a
bond for an amount that will be transferred to disappointed buyers if the
product is of lower quality than advertised.129
When neither reputation investments nor bond posting are practical,
there is a role for third-party intermediaries to play. A third party can
certify the quality of a seller’s products, putting the intermediary’s own
reputation at stake.130 A classic example of such an intermediary is a credit
rating agency, such as Standard & Poor’s or Moody’s.131 The
intermediary’s quality certification is credible because the intermediary is
risking its own reputation by engaging in the certification. If the
certification turns out to be mistaken, the intermediary will suffer a loss of
reputational capital, making it more difficult to sell its certification in the
future. In order to protect its reputational capital, then, the intermediary
will take care to certify products accurately.132
Frank Partnoy has argued convincingly that the reputational capital
model may not apply when the law requires certification by an
intermediary for some purpose. For example, the law requires a certain
rating by a certified credit rating agency in order to permit certain types of

128. I am indebted to David Min for this point.
129. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 11, at 604.
130. See id. at 605.
131. See id.
132. See id. at 604–05.
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investors to purchase a bond.133 The credit rating agency, then, is not only
providing an informational service, it is also serving as a regulatory barrier
to entry. By providing issuers access to investors, the rating agencies sell
a valuable service separate from the rating’s informational value. Because
this gatekeeping function, or “regulatory license,” is so valuable, and
because there are only three certified credit ratings agencies of any real
market importance, the deterrent effect of harm to the rating agencies’
reputational capital caused by providing unduly optimistic credit ratings is
severely diluted. Rating agencies may profit from selling inflated ratings
to issuers even if purchasers disbelieve the ratings—so that the ratings
serve little informational value—because they are providing a regulatory
license to sell bonds and this license to enter the market is highly
valuable.134
There is some danger that Partnoy’s regulatory license theory will
also apply to third-party assessment tools used by benefit corporations.135
The Model Act imposes a number of requirements for third-party
assessments, including some that restrict what sort of entities can create
them.136 While it is unlikely that the BIA will be the only standard that will
qualify, the number of choices may be limited. As a practical matter,
because B Lab plays such a critical role in the benefit corporation
movement, the BIA is likely to be the standard most companies use.
Arguably, then, B Lab will not be deterred from weakening the standard
by threats to its reputational capital, since it serves a regulatory license
function by providing a standard to benefit corporations that they need to
comply with the Model Act.
Although this is an important concern, I do not believe it will
materialize in the benefit corporation context the way it has with credit
rating agencies. Unlike with credit ratings, where statutes require that
issuers earn a certain credit rating from an outside agency to become
eligible to take various actions, the Model Act requires only that benefit
corporations evaluate themselves against some third-party standard.137 The
Model Act does not demand that benefit corporations obtain some
particular achievement level on these assessments.138 Also, the third
party’s only involvement is in the creation of the assessment; companies

133. See Partnoy, Siskel, supra note 12, at 690–703 (describing numerous examples of
regulations requiring a particular credit rating).
134. See generally Partnoy articles, supra note 12.
135. Again, I am indebted to Frank Partnoy for this point.
136. See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 102 (2016) (definition of “third-party standard”).
137. See id. § 401(a).
138. See id.
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perform the evaluations themselves.139 B Lab and the Council therefore
have essentially no power to permit or deny any statutory action a benefit
corporation may desire to take and certainly have no authority to deny
benefit corporation status to an entity that performs poorly on the BIA.
Under these circumstances, it is difficult to see the BIA as analogous to
credit-ratings agencies, who act as regulatory gatekeepers for a variety of
important actions.140
B Lab does control companies’ ability to declare themselves
“Certified B Corps,” but this is not a designation that has any legal
significance. Instead, this designation is best seen as a marketing tool
companies may use to signal their pro-social status to various
constituencies such as customers, employees, and investors.
Still, to the extent the designation provides benefits that companies
would otherwise be unable to obtain, “B Corp” status may be a closer
analogy to the regulatory license scenario than the self-assessment the
Model Act requires. As with a regulatory license, a third party exercises
some control over a company’s ability to participate in a market activity,
and, in this case, the ability to claim pro-social status and its attendant
benefits. Therefore, there may be some danger that, similar to how credit
ratings became important to issuers as a means to access certain markets
rather than as an accurate predictor of the odds a company would default
on its debt,141 B Lab’s certification will become valuable to companies
more for the attendant marketing benefits than as a meaningful statement
about the companies’ pro-social behavior.
The risk here also seems rather small. Unlike credit ratings, which
have a legal effect separate from their information signal, B Lab’s
certification is only meaningful as a method of branding a company as
pro-social. The standard economic analysis of reputational capital should
therefore apply to B Corp certifications. If companies with the certification
behave in ways that seem inconsistent with the values underpinning the
certification—if they are caught polluting the environment, for example,
or ignoring their stated social mission, or treating their workers
poorly—that will erode the value of the certification. B Lab and the
Council therefore have a strong incentive to maintain the integrity of the
certification and protect their reputational capital.
One possible danger here stems from the “big tent” philosophy of the
BIA. Because the BIA attempts to capture many different dimensions of
pro-social behavior, it is not entirely clear what a failure of the standards
139. See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 102 (2016) (definition of “third-party standard”
includes criteria for authors of the standard).
140. See Partnoy, Siskel, supra note 12, at 690–703.
141. See generally Partnoy articles, supra note 12.
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would mean.142 Credit ratings attempt to predict only one type of corporate
behavior: the ability to make payments on the bond when due. Due to the
probabilistic nature of these predictions, there is some ambiguity about
what would constitute a failure. A high rating is not intended as a guaranty
of payment, nor is a low rating a guaranty of default. Ratings are intended
to measure probabilities, not certainties. But for the most part, a ratings
agency that awarded a company’s bonds a high score would likely be seen
to have failed if the company subsequently defaulted. The ratings agency
should have signaled that there was a high likelihood of default but failed
to do so.
In contrast, it is far less clear precisely what B Corp certification
signals. Companies can achieve certification by scoring 80 points out of a
possible 200 on a self-assessment that measures a host of different
behaviors. Those who rely on certification to measure a company’s
behavior could be focusing on anything from a single aspect of the BIA to
a detailed understanding of the BIA as a measurement tool to a gestalt
sense of corporate benevolence.
When a certified company later reveals that it has engaged in some
behavior that might not live up to a user’s perception of what is appropriate
for a certified company, is that a failure of the certification process? Will
it undermine B Lab’s reputational capital, even if it involved conduct that
was disclosed on the self-assessment? Conversely, the muddiness of the
signal certification sends to the public may well shield B Lab’s
reputational capital even when troubling corporate behavior becomes
public, perhaps undermining the incentive B Lab has to protect the
integrity of the certification process.
It is too soon to judge what types of corporate behavior different
segments of the public will perceive as a failure of the certification
process. I suspect, though, that the greater danger is that B Lab’s reputation
will be too easily undermined by a certified company’s poor behavior,
rather than the reverse.
CONCLUSION
The BIA is a deeply considered and eminently reasonable third-party
assessment tool for benefit corporations. Its flaws are, for the most part,
the result of the inescapable tension between the goals of simplicity and
validity and between those of vision and inclusivity. There are areas where
it seems that the BIA can be improved along one dimension without undue
sacrifice along another, however, and I have tried to indicate those areas
to the extent possible.
142. I am indebted to Colin Mayer and David Musto for this point.
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Overall, I tried in this Article to point out the choices the BIA made
with the hope that competing assessment tools will be developed that make
other, equally reasonable, trade-offs among the four goals. I hope for
alternatives, not because the BIA is flawed, but because different
companies might prefer different sets of choices from among the menu of
possible decisions, so there should be a variety of assessments available.
I admire greatly the excellent and pioneering work done by B Lab and the
Council, and I hope my small efforts in this Article will help them and
other organizations that share their goals to improve on what is already a
remarkable achievement.

